Abstracl-Real world dilemmas rarely involved just two choices and perfect interactions without mistakes. In extending the realism of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game, prior evolutionary approaches included intermediate choices or mistakes (noise). This study takes a step further using a coevolving population of neural networks playing the E D game with both intermediate choices and noise. Several issues will be addressed, which include the evolution of cooperation and the evolutionary stability in the presence of noise and mare choices. Our experimental study shows that noise has a negative impact on the evolution of cooperation, but could improve, surprisingly, the evolutionary stability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The abstract mathematical game of IPD is widely studied in the area ranging from political science to biology and artificial intelligence [I] . IPD is interesting in that it is often used to study the conditions that allow for mutual cooperation to occur within a group of selfish individuals. Indeed, the game of IPD is "justifiably famous as an elegant embodiment of the tension between individual rationality (reflected in the incentive of both sides to be selfish) and group rationality (reflected in the higher payoff to both sides for mutual cooperation)" 121. In terms of formal descriptions as a game, the classic IPD is easily defined as a nonzero-sum, noncooperative, two-player game [3] [4]. Unlike zero-sum games such as chess and checkers where the payoff given to a player is taken from the other, the benefit that a player gets is not the same as the penalty the other suffers in the nonzero-sum game of IPD. The game of IPD is noncooperative in that the players do not have any preplay communication.
Although studies into IPD started on quite early with [4], the seminal work by Axelrod 121 [SI who used tournament competitions to study specific properties in strategies that performed well in a toumament environment and that which fostered cooperative play had helped popularised the use of IPD in subsequent research works. Indeed, besides using tournaments in studying the behavior of deterministic strategies, research in IPD had since diversified into many other areas. One of these research areas involved the use evolutionary algorithms to coevolve strategies to cooperative play [61 [7] . Other studies had extended the classic IPD to N number of players [ However, although studies into the classic 2-player IPD with 2 choices have revealed many interesting results, there are significant differences between the classic IPD with 2 chokes and actual dilemmas in the real world, possibly limiting connections between IPD simulation results to actual and observable interactions. One of the more significant differences is the fact that in most interactions between actual individuals, they rarely involve choosing just between two opposite choices.
As such, modelling behavioral interactions that involve only two choices might limit the range of behaviors that can be possibly represented because subtle interactions that involve some intermediate choices could not take place [13] .
In addition to extending IPD to intermediate choices, the other important consideration is to allow for the possibility of misinterpretations or implementation mistakes of choices that players make when playing. Again, the inclusion of such uncertainties will allow for more realistic modelling of behavioral interactions between agents, given that mistakes in implementation or misinterpretations occur in real world settings. Several research works using IPD 1181 [I91 [:201 , other variations of Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) [21] [22] and even the Chicken Game [23] have studied the effects of noise, looking at properties that strategies need in order to cope in a noisy environment as well as studying the evolutionary dynamics of agents in a noisy PD. 1191 in particular, noted that although different modifications to the 7ir-for-Taf are required for different types of noise, unilateral generosity is the best response for sufficiently small amount of noise. Most of these studies into noisy PD will similarly confirm the view that strategies that are more generous perform better in noisy environments.
In this paper, our study will extend the classic 2-player IPD to include both intermediate choices and noise with the aim for more realistic simulation. Furthermore, rather than using a tournament study of fixed strategies, our study uses a coevolving population of neural networks. Focus is placed on the evolutionary behavior of the co-evolving neural networks in learning to play the extended IPD game. It will be shown that although the extended IPD game is more complicated, observations made from previous studies that extended IPD with intermediate choices and noise separately still hold. Finally, implications of experimental results to real world dilemmas will be discussed. 
A. Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
In the classic 2-player IPD. each player has two choices; cooperation and defection. The payoff a player obtains for the choice it makes depends on a payoff matrix ( Table I) that must satisfy the following 3 conditions:
T > R and P > S (Defection always pays more) R > P (Mutual cooperation beats mutual defection) PA is the payoff to player A given that C A and cg are the cooperation levels of players A and B respectively. With the equation above, it is then possible to discretize into any finegrained choices of cooperation. Looking at the payoff matrix, it will be readily obvious that in the case of an n-choice payoff matrix, the four corners are the same payoffs for the 2-choice P D and that any 2 x 2 sub-matrix of the n x n matrix is itself a 2-choice IPD.
PLAYER B
PLAYER -- For a single iteration (one-shot prisoner's dilemma), the rational move will be to defect. However, when the game is played over many iterations and that players have memories of previous rounds, defection is no longer always the best choice. In fact, cooperative play in a diverse environment of players becomes a viable strategy compared to just playing defection. Axelrod in [2] and [SI used a tournament of competing strategies to study the various conditions that promoted cooperative play and showed lit-&-Tat had specific properties (nice, forgiving) that made it successful. Other studies that used computer simulations to study the behavior of a coevolving population of strategies followed, and it was shown that cooperative play can be evolved 161 [241.
B. IPD with Intermediate Choices and Noise
In this paper, the game of IPD with intermediate choices are Again, the constraints are also generalized from the 2-choice IPD case, where the first two constraints will ensure that defection always pays more and mutual cooperation payoff is higher compared to mutual defection. The third constraint ensures that alternating between cooperation and defection does not pay compared to just playing cooperation. As such, given the payoff equation and the three constraints above, an n-choice IPD can be formulated. However, it should be noted that in choosing the number of choices, only even number of choices are used, where the line between full cooperation and full defection is at the zero point [15].
As for specific implementation of noise in this study, noise is simply the error that takes place when a neural network player makes a choice and that the error has a certain probability of occurrence, p. For example, consider the case of an IPD game of 4 choices with p = 0.05. In this game setting, suppose that the player chooses to play at +U3 cooperation level, which is just a step below full cooperation. Given the setting, there is a 5 9% chance at that particular move that another cooperation level is made and perceived by the opponent instead. When this occurs, then the other possible cooperation levels that can be chosen are + 1 , -113 and -1, and that they all have equal probability of taking place.
EXPERIMENTAL S E T U P
In this section, the experimental setup of the paper will be described in more detail. In general, a population of coevolving neural networks is used to learn to play the game of 2-player IPD with 4 choices and noise. The neural network will be restricted to just using a memory length of 1. This simplifies the game strategy to a function of just two variables; the player's previous level of cooperation and the opponent's previous level of cooperation. Cooperation levels can take the value of + I , +1/3, -113 and -1. As such, a more extensive analysis can be carried out on the experiment, especially in looking at the way IPD strategies are being represented by the neural networks and how noise might affect the evolution of IPD strategies.
A. Neural Network Representation of IPD Game Strategies
As noted in [16], a much better and convenient alternative to using look-up tables is to use a simple neural network, whose input-output mappings can be used to represent IPD game strategies. In this paper, feed-forward multilayer perceptrons (MLPs) are used. MLP had been successfully used in a number of evolutionary computation-neural network hybrid experiments involving checkers [25] , Othello [26] as well as
The architecture of the neural network is fixed, with an input layer followed by a single hidden layer and subsequently an output node. The input layer is a vector that consists of four components (input nodes) and takes in the following:
Opponent's previous level of cooperation. An input of + I if the opponent had exploited the neural network, and 0 otherwise. An input of +I if neural network exploited opponent, and 0 otherwise. It can be seen that the last two components depend on the first two components. Thus, the input layer is just a function of two variables; the neural network's previous level of cooperation and the opponent's previous level of cooperation. However, with the additional two input nodes, the neural network can readily recognize whether it is being exploited or that it is exploiting others without having to leam to subtract or to discern the difference in the cooperation levels between itself and its opponent [15].
After that, the input layer is fully interconnected to the first hidden layer. in which 10 hidden nodes are used in the experiment. Previous studies on IPD with intermediate choices have shown that co-evolution of neural networks with 10 hidden nodes is capable of producing mutual cooperative behaviors between the neural networks [141. Meanwhile, [13] has shown that a minimum complexity level is required for a single hidden layer MLP to represent IF'D game strategies with continuous intermediate choices to allow for the evolution of mutual cooperation. The hidden layer nodes are then fully interconnected to an output node that provides an output value, which is used to determine the particular choice of the neural network's next move. In designing the MLP, each of the hidden nodes as well as the output node will sum its inputs and a bias before passing the sum to a sigmoid function that provides nonlinearities. The particular sigmoid function that is used is the hyperbolic tangent function, tanh(z), and that the output is scaled between -1 to + I .
As such, although the neural network output is a real value, it is later discretized to either +I, +1/3, -113 or -1. depending on which particular discrete value the neural network ou!.put is closer to.
E. Evolutionary Algorithm
A co-evolutionary method is implemented on the population of neural networks so that it is possible for the neural networks to compete with one another and that an arms race can. be instigated to improve their IPD game playing strategies. As in [251 [26] , offspring neural networks are generated from parent neural networks using self-adaptation. Each neural network is associated with a self-adaptive parameter vector [ui(j)], which controls the mutation step size of the respective weights and biases of the neural network [wi(j)]. From [3] [26], the use of self-adaptation as the primary variation operator has resulted in some interesting observations of game playing strategies of co-evolved neural networks. The co-evolution of neural networks starts with the random initialization of 15 parent neural networks. In initializing the parent neural networks, caution must be taken to ensure that they have behavioral or phenotypic diversities in addition to genotypic diversities [IS] . In order to ensure reasonable initial behavioral diversities in the population, the following settings are adopted after some experimentations with different settings. In particular, the weights and biases of each of the parent neural networks are randomly generated by sampling from a uniform distribution over [-2.5, +2.51. Each component of the self-adaptive parameters for all the parent neural networks are first initialized to 0.5 for consistency with the initialization range of neural network weights and biases. In addition, inputoutput mappings on the parent neural networks are conducted to ensure that given the 16 possible input sets for an IPD game with 4 choices, the frequency at which each of the four choices (+l, +1/3, -113, -1) is played for each of the parent neural networks' strategies (input-output mappings) are the same.
Upon initializing the parent neural networks, the procedure for generating the offspring neural networks is given by the following equations: is a standard Gaussian random variable re-sampled for every j . N, is the total number of weights, biases and the pre-game inputs required for an IPD strategy based on memory-length of 1. Given each of the 10 hidden layer nodes has 4 input weights and 1 bias while the output node itself has 10 inputs and 1 bias, and that 2 pre-game inputs a e required for strategies with memory-length of 1 at the start of the game, N, works out to 63.
After generating 15 offspring neural networks from the corresponding 15 parent neural networks, all neural networks will compete with each other in the game of IPD. Using round robin, each neural network will play with every other neural network in the population, including its twin. The fitness of a neural network is assigned by taking the average payoff that it receives from all the games it played. The best half of the neural networks' population is selected as parents for the next generation. Elitism is used where the best neural networks are copied unchanged to the next generation. The process of generating offspring, tournament competition and selection are repeated for a finite number of times to allow the observation of evolutionary behavior of the neural networks.
C. The Shadow of the Future
In IPD, the shadow of the future refers to the situation where the number of iterations of the IPD game is known in advance. In this situation, there is no incentive to cooperate in the last move because there is no risk of retaliation from the opponent. However, if every player defects on the last move, then there is no incentive to cooperate in the move before (the second last move). If every player defects in the last two moves, then there is no incentive to cooperate in the move prior to the last two moves. In fact, this will continue on until the very first move.
As such, to address this issue and to allow for cooperation to emerge, one popular way is to have a fixed probability in ending the game on each successive move, thereby keeping the game length uncertain. However, for this experiment, a fixed game length of 150 moves (move start from 0) is used instead. This is due to the fact that the individual IF' D game strategies are represented in a simple manner using neural networks. and that they cannot count the number of moves. The game length is chosen to be comparable to the experiment conducted in [61.
1V. RESULTS
In this paper, a total of 8 experiments were conducted. Each experiment set was conducted for 30 independent runs, where each run lasted up to 600 generations. The first experiment was conducted without noise. The following I experiments were conducted with varying degrees of noise levels that were given by the noise probability of occurence. p. The different noise probabilities that were investigated are 0.05 % 0, = 0.0005), 0.1 %, 0.15 %, 0.2 %, 0.25 %, 0.5 %,and 1.5 %. Fig. I shows simulation results of a co-evolving population of neural networks playing the IPD game with 4 choices and without noise, after averaging over 30 runs and across the population for each run (to obtain the population average payoffs). Fig. 1 shows that the average payoff starts from 2.5, dropping to around 2.2 before rapidly increasing to an For these runs however, the average payoffs did seem to Ructuate around some values for a substantial number of generations before some violent fluctuations push them to either higher cooperating plays or towards lower cooperating plays.
A. Evolution of Cooperation: IPD with 4 Choices
A sample of 10 runs was plotted into Fig. 2 From Fig. 4 , it can be seen that the population average payoffs for the 4 experiment sets with noise probabilities 0.05 9h to 0.2 % follow a similar trend. The average payoffs in these experiment sets drop from 2.5 before slowly fluctuating to around2.25. In comparing the experiment sets, Fig. 4 suggests that full cooperation was played less often in experiment sets with noise compared to the experiment set where noise was not present at all.
In order to obtain more meaningful data, individual runs of the experiment sets were analyzed. For the experiment set with 0.05 % noise, a total of 13 runs had an average payoff greater than 2 at generation 600. A few runs had the final average payoffs at generation 600 close to 4 while the majority of the runs actually had the final average payoffs close to 1 instead. Although this might seem to indicate that the addition of noise at 0.05 % actually encouraged play for full defection, it was actually far from it. In fact, looking at Fig. 5 , which is a sample of 10 runs out of 30, it would seem that the evolutionary behavior was actually chaotic. The majority of the runs did not converge to either full cooperation or full defection play. Instead, there seemed to be violent and erratic fluctuations between full cooperation and full defection all the way from the start until the end of evolution. Fig. 6 , which plots the average frequency that a certain cooperation level is played across all runs will confirm that although full defection is played more often (around 55 %) compared to full cooperation (at 42 %), the difference between their frequency of play is not great, which helps to illustrate the violent fluctuations seen in the individual runs. Similar results are observed in the experiment sets involving 0.1 %, 0.15 % and 0.2 % noise levels. However, it is noticeable that as noise probabilities increased, fluctuations between full cooperation and defection play are less violent (Fig. 7) . In fact, some runs in the experiment set with 0.2 % noise stayed around some full cooperation, defection as well as intermediate levels for much longer time after populations were first initialized.
C. Experiment Results for
Noise Probabilities of 0.25 %, 0.5 % and 1.5 % In order to determine the effects of higher noise levels in the IPD game with 4 choices, experiment sets with noise probabilities of 0.25 %, 0.5 % and 1.5 % were conducted. Fig. 9 compares the population average payoffs throughout 600 generations between experiment set without noise and those with higher noise levels. As observed in previous experiment sets with lower noise levels, the population average payoffs of all these 3 experiment sets fluctuated from 2.5 to a lower value at around 1.75, which again indicates that the majority In comparing the results of experiments sets with lower noise levels (0.05 %, 0.1 %, 0.15 %, and 0.2 %) against those with higher noise levels (0.25 %, 0.5 %, and 1.5 W ) , the observation that experiment sets with higher noise levels ended at lower population average payoffs would suggest that lower cooperation levels were played more often as noise levels increased. Indeed, comparing individual runs between these two sets would reveal more runs that evolved towards full defection with higher noise levels. Furthermore, at least 13 runs in experiments sets with lower noise levels ended with average payoffs greater than 2 compared to less than 10 runs in experiment sets with higher noise levels that ended higher.
As for the frequency at which certain cooperation levels were played, experiments with higher noise levels all showed a similar trend where full defection was played around 75 % compared to full cooperation being played around 24 % across 30 runs (Fig. 11) . This difference in frequency of play is greater in the experiment sets with higher noise level (Fig. 1 1) compared to the difference observed in experiment sets with lower noise levels ( Fig. 6 and Fig. 8 ). However, it is interesting to observe that although the increase in noise levels resulted in more play towards full defection, there were several runs in all these experiment sets whereby the population average payoffs stayed at some intermediate levels. In addition to that, as the noise levels increased from 0.25 '70 to 1.5 90, there were less runs with violent fluctuations between full cooperation and full defection ( 
V. DISCUSSION
Previous results from the experiments on IPD with intermediate choices [I41 [16] have shown that the addition of more choices to play actually reduces cooperative play among the neural networks' population. With noise added to the IPD game with 4 choices, the experiment results described above show that the evolution towards cooperation is even less likely. Furthermore, as noise level increases, the evolution towards full defection is more likely. This is further confirmed when the individual neural networks at the end of their runs were compared with a Er-for-Tat player for IPD with 4 choices. This Et-for-Tar player basically starts the game with a full cooperation move. After the first move, it will reciprocate its opponent's moves, which can be any of the 4 choices. With this comparison, it was observed that there were at least 25 runs in the experiment set without noise where full cooperation play was achieved between the neural network players and the Er-for-Tar player. However, as noise was added, the number of runs with similar full cooperation play dropped to 13 for low noise levels and then to 9 for higher noise levels.
On the evolutionary behavior of the co-evolving population of neural networks. experiment results show that for higher noise levels, greater evolutionary stability is observed, with population average payoffs staying around a certain intermediate value longer and with smaller fluctuations compared to runs without noise. The observation about noise assisting with evolutionary stability is in line with previous arguments in [27] . Although the majority of the runs ended with defection, there were other runs that first started from defecting play before shifting to and staying at higher cooperation levels lor a longer number of generations. In fact, the populations in these runs were quite resistant to invasion by fully defecting strategies. However, it was observed that these strategies could be invaded by strategies playing at higher cooperation levels, which in turn were vulnerable to invasions by defecting strategies. As noted in [21] that used a particular strategy representation in the form of linear equations called linear reactive strategies, similar observation of such unending cycles or stable polymorphism of cooperation and defection play c:an be seen in the experiment set with higher noise levels (Fig. IO) .
However, when the noise levels are particularly low, ithe addition of such noises actually causes erratic, unstable evolutionary behavior of the neural networks' population, characterized by violent fluctuations between full cooperation and full defection. Looking closely at individual neural networks' strategies during the shift of average payoffs from one level to another showed a corresponding change in the way the neural networks play as well. In some runs, the entire neural networks' population would be playing mostly full defection for several generations before strategies playing higher cooperation levels such as -1/3 and +I13 slowly invaded and gained foothold for the next few generations. After that, the population either evolved towards higher cooperation levels (up to full cooperation) or it could drop again to lower cooperation levels. It is not clear how an addition of noise at low levels can cause such instability in evolutionary behavior. However, it is certain that having more choices and having a small amount of noise actually help in pushing the neural networks from playing at one cooperation level to another within several generations.
One possible explanation to such instability of evolutionary behavior might relate to the fact that the presence of noise actually punishes the majority of neural networks that are playing mostly at a specific cooperation level. For example, consider the fact that the majority of the population only plays defection regardless of previous moves. With noise, it is possible that such strategies actually perform worse compared to strategies that do not just play defection all the time. This is due to the fact that noise will always change the choices played by fully defecting players to choices with higher cooperation level, thus causing these players to earn lower payoffs. Due to the fact that a neural network player's fitness is determined by the total payoffs that it received, the chances of fully defecting players being retained for the next generation to gene:rate similar offspring become slimmer. Furthermore, intermediate choices also help lower the gap required for a population to evolve between full cooperation and full defection because there are less risks involved for using intermediate choices compared to choosing either extremes.
Finally, in relating the observations to real world dilemmas where the environment is noisy and allows degrees of cooperation levels 1281, the co-evolutionary setting in this paper would suggest that although generosity is appropriate, strategies that are generous enough might not he easily evolved and evolutionary stable at the same time. Likewise, there are many factors that inhibit generosity among real individuals [22] . When misinterpretations are rare, generosity might open someone to exploitation and continued interactions might encourage further temptation to exploit. As such, it is difficult for unilateral generosity to flourish throughout a long term interaction. However, in the case where misinterpretations are more frequent, it will appear that although it is necessarily difficult to he generous, it is the better response if everyone adopts it.
VI. CONCLUSION
The results have shown that when noise is added to an IPD game with 4 choices, the evolution towards cooperation is less likely compared to the same IPD game where noise is not present. However, with respect to the evolutionary b e haviour of co-evolving neural networks' population, different noise levels have different effects. At low noise levels, the addition of noise actually causes instability to the evolution, with violent fluctuations between full cooperation and full defection. One possible explanation is that neural networks that just play a single choice regardless of previous moves are punished for mistakes due to noise. For higher noise levels, evolutionary stability is observed although the evolution tends towards defection play. For a population that is evolving at a certain cooperation level, the population is resistant to invading strategies playing at lower cooperation levels.' The population however. can he invaded by strategies with higher cooperating play which in turn are vulnerable to defecting strategies. Lastly, observations made will suggest that although generosity is the better response, it is difficult for individuals to discover and to maintain it at face value.
